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

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Globalisation and Diplomacy

Iver B. Neumann

[Abstract] Globalisation is shorthand for changes in space, time and the relationship between them. This paper, which will be forthcoming as a chapter in a book edited by Andrew Cooper and published by the United Nations University Press, argues that changes in de-territorialisation will not have thoroughgoing effects for diplomacy. A change in time, notably the change to zero lag-time in information flows, is, on the other hand, of key importance. So is the increase in the sheer mass and density of communication. If transcending boundaries is the essence of globalisation, then it stands to reason that state diplomats must sooner or later take cognizance of the other kinds of polities that exist within the system.

Globalisation and Diplomacy

In the mid-1970s, when I was a teenager, I asked my godfather, a palaeontologist, whether he thought global warming was a man-made or a natural phenomenon. He replied that, however substantive the changes wrought by human beings might be, there was no way we could have substantially affected the cycle of global warming that has covered the billions of years over which the earth had existed. When I pointed out that the time span that I had in mind was the period of less than 20,000 years, during which human societies had been sedentary, he remarked that such periods were simply too short to be of interest to a palaeontologist – and that was the end of our discussion.

Similarly, what is new about globalisation and what is relevant to diplomacy depends on your perspective. I will begin by tracing the phenomenon as changes in how space, time and density mould global politics. I will go on to argue that globalisation has a forerunner in internationalisation, and will discuss some key changes that internationalisation has brought to diplomacy. I then proceed to ask whether there are ways in which the changes in diplomacy that characterised internationalisation are now being further intensified, whether there are new factors afoot, and whether we are looking at changes that will cumulate in a major change in diplomatic practices on the whole. First, let us look at globalisation.

SPACE

If diplomacy is defined broadly enough – say, as the mediated exchange between polities – then globalisation does not necessarily emerge as a vital challenge to modern-day diplomats, and any changes that it brings to diplomacy appear inconsequential to its practice. The literature provides an early example of this approach in the work of Adam Watson, ([1982] 1984), who was primarily interested in changes in international systems as they have unfolded over the last five thousand years. When confronted with a new issue area such as human rights, he rested content with the assertion that time-honoured practices would take care of it.

If, however, we define diplomacy as the written exchange of documents between states, where ‘state’ is understood as the kind of centralised, hierarchical and bounded polity that has emerged in Europe and then spread across the globe over the past five centuries or so, then globalisation becomes a key challenge to the practice of diplomacy. The reason is spatial organisation. The state is a polity based on a particular territorial mode of organisation. Weber saw it as a claimed monopoly on the use of physical force. Schum-

peter saw it as a claimed monopoly on taxation. Durkheim saw it as a nexus of domination between a power elite and a spatially bounded society. In any case, we are talking about a spatial area that at any given time remains the same, and that is clearly delineated for all involved. The delineations may vary over time and they may at any given time be contested, but the principle of delineation remains essential. Globalisation inherently involves de-territorialisation: hence, it is an *ipso facto* challenge to the state.

Indeed, it may be argued that we have been here before. For example, during the Middle Ages, spatial organisation was fluid. Not all polities were bounded, and different polities faced different challenges. This made for a plethora of diplomatic practices. Take the 1240s. Certain realms were fairly centralised, particularly in the north of what had at times been referred to as 'Europe' some four hundred years before and would be known by that moniker again within some two hundred years. The people who were sent on embassies, however, were not specifically trained to deal with foreign kings. They were the same individuals that the monarch used for dealing with his nobles. There was no such thing as foreign policy personnel whatsoever, for the simple reason that there was no division between 'foreign' and 'domestic' policy (Neumann, forthcoming). The same went for papal *missi*: these messengers were used for dealing with persons of power, regardless of where they fit into the spatial organisation (Der Derian, 1987). We have a survival of this practice in the etymology of the term 'exequatur' for the agreement of a polity's head to allow someone to serve as a consul to another polity. Furthermore, even if the *missi* were seemingly specialists in diplomacy, there was no guarantee that they would head diplomatic missions. For example, of the three missions sent by Pope Innocent IV to meet the invading Mongols at this time, none seems to have been manned by *missi* (Ruotsala, 2001). Furthermore, that diplomats often hailed from the same polity as the one they represented was largely due to convenience. This look at diplomacy in the 1240s demonstrates that de-territorialised politics is not anything new, and that diplomatic functions can reflect this kind of spatial organisation.

TIME AND DENSITY

Simply because the de-territorialisation of politics is nothing new does not mean that globalisation is not a new challenge for diplomats. In fact, globalisation entails two more crucial factors in addition to space. The first of these is time. The speed with which information and, to a slightly lesser degree, material objects can travel is rapidly increasing. Again, it may be argued that the challenges posed to diplomacy by this shrinking of response time are not new. For example, if one compares the response of diplomacy to the advent of cable-based telegraphy from the 1860s onwards and the advent of the internet over a century later, there are obvious parallels to be drawn. In both cases, the changes were driven by the military and by merchants, and resisted by diplomats, who were reluctant to use this technology when it was introduced – although it soon became an indispensable tool for diplomats (Nickles, 2003). In both cases, the reasons for the reluctance can be attributed to a fear of compromising secret information and of admitting under-

lings into the heart of the organisation. This pattern may be found, to a lesser degree, where all new technology is concerned (for an additional example, consider the telephone). Historically, diplomats seem to be particularly petrified by social change, but eventually they, like everybody else, are forced to respond. In the case of space, the changes have to do with the recurrence of a pattern; where time is concerned, the changes have more to do with the intensification of a pattern.

The second factor, density (in the sense introduced by John Ruggie), is also associated with intensification. The density of flows of everything – from persons (tourism, migration) to information (TV programmes, internet home pages) to goods – is higher than ever. For diplomacy, one obvious consequence is that consular work has exploded and the potential tasks are literally infinite. True, in the late 19th century the flow of goods was intense and increasing rapidly, but the absolute number of people involved was much less than what it is today. Furthermore, the total global population was significantly lower (something in the order of one in every ten human beings who has ever lived has done so in the post-Second World War period), so in absolute terms the flows of persons and goods today are absolutely unprecedented. This density has effects that are not only quantitative but also qualitative, for it challenges the very ‘boundedness’ of the state. A polity may be called ‘bounded’ only between that polity and other polities there exists a set of boundaries important in a sufficient number of contexts. Thus, there is a threshold for how large the flows of information and material objects may be perceived to be, before the polity is no longer thought of as bounded. Once the density of communication exceeds this threshold, the polity is no longer clearly territorialised.

The flow of immigrants into the USA is substantial, as is the flow of information and material objects in and out of that country. The US government has reacted by thinking about territorialisation in a new way. For example, it is taxing certain goods and services at the source and insisting on US jurisdiction over companies that are noted on US stock exchanges, regardless of their physical location. The government is also imposing a certain number of de-territorialised practices, such as e-mail surveillance. Nonetheless, the USA can hardly be called a de-territorialised state. But the changes are of such a magnitude and are increasing at such a pace that we may easily imagine a situation in which the ‘density threshold’ is perceived to be surpassed.¹

In sum, the de-territorialisation of politics which is at the heart of globalisation is nothing new. However, the degree to which time and density have intensified is indeed new, as is the combination of these three factors.

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¹ Indeed, one way of interpreting the diplomacy of the Bush era is as an overall attempt to salvage the principle of territoriality in an era of globalisation: homogenisation of space by means of direct investment, etc., in NAFTA and Europe (‘the democratic peace’); attempts to make the rest of the world more compatible with the US model in most other places; use of force where this strategy is seen to have scant prospects (‘rogue states’ like Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran); and attacks on the idea of multilateral diplomacy and the institutions within which it is practised.

INTERNATIONALISATION

As noted, the world has seen intensification in time and density before, in the process that began to accelerate somewhere around the Seven Years' War (1756–63) and that gathered momentum around the time of the First World War. Let us call it internationalisation, and see it as a phenomenon that foreshadows globalisation. Then, too, the key changes had to do with intensifications of time and density. New technologies played a key role (the telegraph, the cable/wire, the telephone), and there was a considerable time-lag before diplomats were forced to implement changes that were already well under way elsewhere in the political world. Internationalisation eventually brought about key changes – including mounting pressure for accountability, and a broadening of recruitment patterns and multilateral diplomacy. It is instructive to consider briefly how diplomacy was changed by these developments, because it can indicate ways in which diplomacy is being challenged by globalisation as well.

Where accountability is concerned, diplomacy left its relations to parliament largely to the top politicians, and thickened its interface to the press and the media. Here we are talking about a build-up of outer bulwarks in the organisation, typically called Press and Information Departments, that were low in internal prestige and whose job it was to serve or forestall journalists.²

The broadening of recruitment patterns started with a change from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie (mainly at the end of the 19th century). It continued with women (especially around the Second World War), and went on to encompass new social groups (so far, largely in Western countries). The overall trend here has been the same as in the case of technology: diplomats lag behind soldiers and merchants, but before very long they mimic the changes that have taken place in these spheres.

Fairly quickly, the new institutional form of permanent multilateral diplomacy that was to be found in the League of Nations went from being the preserve of politicians to that of diplomats. Furthermore, it fell to foreign ministries to staff the offices of the League – which they generally did by drawing on people from their own ranks, including the diplomatic services. As the number of international organisation (IO) employees increased, fewer entered directly from the diplomatic services, but recruitment remained largely the preserve of the world's foreign ministries. We are talking about delegation of key functions under the guidance of a foreign ministry-based cadre here (Weiss, 1975).

It has been observed that some of the key changes expected to flow from internationalisation did not happen. First and foremost there was the predicted fall of permanent representations. Referring precisely to the ever-increasing density of international and transnational relations, analysts like George Modelski predicted the demise of the state's permanent representation. With tongue in cheek, Modelski suggested that the whole institution be substituted by a ship afloat on some world ocean, with one ambassadorial cabin per state, where the ambassadors could conveniently exchange calls and dine with each another.

² Instructively, in several foreign ministries the key press spokesperson is not even attached to this department, but is rather to be found in the secretariat.

In fact, Modelski's comment was not much more than an elegant way of pointing out that the ambassadorial function of representation had become less important. Even between pairs of states where contact density has been extremely high for decades (as in Scandinavia) or in countries engaged in an advanced state of supranational integration (like the Original Six of today's EU), the resident ambassador holds sway. Internationalisation has brought new practices to diplomacy – but, much like new technologies, instead of supplanting the older ones, they have attached themselves nicely to their number.

MORE OF THE SAME

With globalisation, there has been a further increase where the pressure for accountability and the broadening of recruitment patterns and multilateral diplomacy are concerned.

The pressure for accountability has not first and foremost taken the form of further calls for parliamentarian control, although there is patchy movement in this direction. The key change seems to concern relations with the media. More than half a century ago, Marshall McLuhan (1962: 41) pointed out that compression in time and space had put the speed of information at a premium and changed our ways of understanding the world: '[When...] a new technology extends one or more of our senses outside us into the social world, then new ratios among all of our senses will occur in that particular culture. It is comparable to what happens when a new note is added to a melody.'

It is journalists who are the principal composers of globalisation. Gone are the days when members of the press respectfully approached diplomats in the hope of picking up some treasured comment.³ Today's journalists and diplomats are mutually dependent on one another. *Ceteris paribus*, it is the journalists that set the pace by breaking the news, and the diplomats who react. In the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, morning meetings address the question of how to respond to headline news. Furthermore, although the media regularly decide to carry a story for days in a row, and thereby succeed in forcing the Ministry into a defensive posture, the converse is rarely the case. We should, of course, not over-generalise this trend. Any foreign ministry may still withhold from the media information that it deems to be particularly sensitive, and will continue to do so. During the Thatcher years, the British Foreign Office was able to play favourites, and often denied overtly critical journalists access to its daily briefings. Still, the trend remains clear and ubiquitous: the level of access for journalists that is considered 'normal' by all parties is rising, and all this is happening in the name of transparency. This norm is part and parcel of the state–society model now spreading across the globe, and that means that as long as ministries and politicians do not take active measures to halt or reverse the trend, it is bound to continue.

Ever since people like Benjamin Franklin and Tom Paine played a role in internationalisation by casting themselves as diplomats of mankind, much has been made of the importance of 'world society' and 'world opinion'.

³ See, for example, Dickie (2004).

While world opinion is a social fact, what remains unclear is how it should be conceptualised. Nor is it evident to what degree world opinion impinges on foreign policy outcomes. National public opinions are multifaceted and blurry as well, and we have endless examples of how political outcomes may run against them – but that does not stop them from acting as very real parts of any politician’s equation. For diplomats, who deal in changing peoples’ impressions of countries and of events, world opinion is important, and it looms larger and larger as space becomes compressed.⁴

Globalisation means that the question of information becomes a question of proliferating target groups. Whereas the diplomatic function of information used to concern gathering information and presenting it to politicians, the circle of relevant takers has expanded. Public diplomacy, once the curious preserve of Soviet diplomats, is primarily targeting domestic media these days, but there are other targets as well. More is being spent on entertaining foreign journalists. It is not unheard-of for ambassadors to write letters to the editor or even appear on TV in their host countries. The Canadian innovation of staging town hall meetings has begun to spread. Utilising interactive arenas for discussing foreign policy on and off the Internet is increasingly common, indeed it is expected. Since Internet discussions can hardly be limited to citizens, the nature of that medium may further open up space for non-citizen voices, thus further blurring the distinction between citizens and foreign nationals. Malleable geographical boundaries go together with malleable social boundaries. Briefly, the deepening and broadening of accountability experienced by diplomats means that the area of validity for the old adage ‘never apologise, never explain’ is diminishing, while the costs of following it are increasing.

Diplomatic services are also experiencing greater pressure for widening their recruitment practices. Since globalisation involves migration, and since ethnicity remains a key principle of social organisation around the globe, countries that are experiencing widespread immigration are also experiencing pressures for more diplomats with an ethnic minority background. This is old hat in immigrant societies like the USA, Israel and, more recently, Canada, but it makes for increasing tension in states and diplomatic services with a longer history of mainstream-only representation. The gains to diplomatic services of having personnel with diverse linguistic and cultural skills are obvious – as are the possible areas of tension involved.

So far, pressure for more diverse recruitment has concerned citizens. Given the nature of globalisation, however, it would not be surprising to see a return of the once quite established and non-controversial practice of using non-citizens as regular diplomats. After all, this practice survived until well into the 18th century and would in several ways signify an historical normalisation. We see a special case of this already in the regular exchanges of diplomats between foreign ministries, with French diplomats serving in the British Foreign Office, Hungarian diplomats in the Norwegian MFA, and so on.

⁴ A relatively recent example, which also illustrates the power of a popular culture genre, is how a series of caricatures of the prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper spawned diplomatic activity in dozens of states.

NEW FACTORS

Novelty is relative. If we ever find ourselves (or land ourselves) in the situation of having to establish diplomatic first contact with aliens, some researcher is certain to produce a piece on how first contacts between ancient cultures may be seen as a predecessor. Every Jesus has his John the Baptist. So if it is assumed that the exchange of diplomats between diplomatic services is following an established historical pattern, whereas co-opting diplomats from NGOs is not, this distinction is, in the final analysis, an arbitrary one. Nonetheless, when, at Robin Cook's behest, the Foreign Office recruited Amnesty International's former parliamentary officer to advise on human rights, and a member of Save the Children to work on the rights of children, he went from soliciting advice to headhunting people. If that is not totally new, there is certainly a novelty to his reverse move, which was to second people from the Foreign Office's own human-rights department to Article 19 and to the Minority Rights Group (*The Economist*, 6 March 1999). These movements of people between the state sector and NGOs add to a certain increase in movement among a state's ministries (Cooper and Hocking, 2000).

There is of course considerable variation among services when it comes to the level of diplomatic exclusivity associated with recruitment and training patterns. In France, state officials are educated *en bloc*; the best tend to choose employment in the Ministry of Finance, whereas the runners-up go to the Quai d'Orsay; in the USA, there is an open exam; in Norway, there is application followed by a two-tiered exam system. The more closed the system, the greater the shock of having to migrate to NGOs. Furthermore, in countries (like the USA) that avail themselves of the spoils system for ambassadorial posts, the *problematique* of the closed system is valid only for organisational strata up to the ambassadorial level. We may add that diplomats throughout the 20th century often went on leave to work as judges, business analysts etc., and later returned to their service; so whatever the degree of professionalisation, diplomacy has never been an entirely closed system. Nonetheless, it is a fact that the *esprit de corps* amongst diplomats has been fostered by common training, the feeling of belonging to the chosen few, and shared nomadic professional experience. By 'taking people in from the street', as the saying goes, this principle is put under strain. It is also challenged when diplomats are put to work if not on the street, then in (other) non-traditional settings. Even if diplomats have always been nomadic, there is something new about migrating between an MFA and NGOs rather than between MFAs and postings abroad, or MFAs and IOs. Changes in recruitment patterns mirror changes in other diplomatic practices. The explosion in multilateral diplomacy is being followed by a broadening in the kind of entities between which diplomats mediate.

Here, we have arrived at a logical consequence of globalisation. If transcending boundaries is the essence of the phenomenon and this means that the state system must increasingly be seen as only one part of the global political system, then it stands to reason that state diplomats must sooner or later take cognizance of the other kinds of polities that exist within the system. If negotiation and, more widely, mediation is a key diplomatic function, then the work of these diplomats increasingly involves mediating not only

between the state, but also between it and other polities. Neither is it surprising that the question of whether these other polities may be called ‘domestic’ or ‘foreign’ is not necessarily of the essence. The domestic/foreign distinction is a correlate of state boundaries. If state boundaries become relativised, so too with the domestic/foreign distinction.

Again, one may argue that this development is nothing new by pointing to the already widespread proliferation of state agencies that pursue diplomatic practices. Students of diplomacy have covered this well. From the late 1960s, the ‘comparative foreign policy’ school detailed the challenge that other ministries posed to diplomatic services (Hermann et al., 1987; Rosenau, 1969). Some twenty years later, a small set of literature on sub-state diplomacy emerged (Hocking, 1993; Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; Neumann, 2002). Moreover, throughout the European Union, the various prime ministers’ offices have played an increasingly important role in the shaping of diplomacy.⁵ But where is the literature on the diplomacy of state–NGO relations? For example, although states are the standard targets for the work of what Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to as transnational agency networks, little has been written about state responses. These responses make up a growing part of diplomacy, and should be examined.

The increasing significance of other kinds of polities is a potential challenge to the exclusivity of state diplomats. Since every polity needs diplomacy, there is an increasing number of groups that look like functional equivalents of diplomats. They are sometimes even referred to as diplomats – also in the academic literature (Stopford and Strange, 1991). As yet, this seems infelicitous, for the simple reason that the tasks undertaken by these people do not generally add up to the tasks of a diplomat. The key functions of diplomacy can be said to be three: information gathering, negotiation and communication (Wight, 1977: 115–17). Bull (1977: 171–72) adds ‘minimisation of the effects of friction’ and ‘symbolising the existence of the society of states’; this can be called smoothing and representation.⁶ Typically, the groups outside the diplomatic services who carry out functions equivalent to these do not handle the full gamut of such tasks. For example, any transnational firm of some size will have people working on information gathering and communication as well as employing negotiators – but typically, these are different individuals. Again, travel agencies will have offices overseas representing them, but the people working there will be different from those who do the information gathering and negotiation. It would be a mistake to maintain that even the most central diplomat encapsulates all five functions at the same point in time; nonetheless, so far, state diplomats seem to combine them to a qualitatively higher degree than do representatives of other kinds of polities.

As an example, consider expatriates working for development NGOs. This may be the one group of non-diplomats that comes closest to combining

⁵ The explosion in so-called summit diplomacy may be seen as a case of non-diplomats availing themselves of the shrinking of space and time to take matters in their own hands. But the individuals involved are by definition top politicians, usually heads of state, and they have always had the last word in affairs diplomatic. By rushing things to the top, summit diplomacy may serve as shorthand for the kind of possibilities that globalisation opens up, but it does not involve a radical reshuffling of diplomacy. See Dunn (1996).

⁶ We may expand Bull’s point of symbolising the society of states by postulating that these people symbolise global or world society.

the traditional functions of diplomats – but they are still a far stretch from doing it to the same degree as traditional diplomats. Moreover, foreign ministries have thus far been able to control these groups fairly effortlessly. Where NGOs are concerned, the pattern is that foreign ministries tend to co-opt NGOs once they have reached a certain mass, and turn them into quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs). In Norway, for example, there are five large NGOs working in the field of development, two of which are detachments of transnational outfits (Red Cross, Save the Children). All five receive more than 90 per cent of their financial budgets from the Norwegian state, as administered by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry. Diplomats remain in control. So far, there are very few examples of developmentalists (or ‘well-diggers’, to use diplomatic jargon) scuppering diplomats, but plenty of examples of the reverse.

There is an outright exception to what has been said, which is that politician, in the capacity of heads of state and government, foreign ministers and the like, have always been the diplomats’ bosses, so this is nothing new. The challenge to diplomats is the same as the challenge to the states for which they work: to deal with the new polities and personnel of globalisation. If the state and the diplomat undergo changes in order to handle this task, it is not a foregone conclusion that their relative importance will diminish as a result of globalisation.

The circle of what may be called the diplomat’s ‘relevant others’ – those other social groups with which the diplomat has to work – is widening. As yet, however, no other group has personnel that come as close to embodying the whole range of relevant functions as does the diplomat. An interesting trend is the growing use that other actors make of former diplomats (retired or otherwise). There is a large literature on the importance of privatisation in the realm of security and the role played by companies such as Sandlines and Executive Outcomes. Increasingly, transnational corporations and other polities are using former diplomats – and this needs to be studied.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we may ask which transformations are necessary for state diplomats to maintain their importance. The key challenge springs from the very nature of globalisation. Density makes possible new polities, and the reconfiguration of space and time increase the viability and reach of these new polities within the global political system. As the diplomats’ circle of relevant others widens, they are faced with the challenge of mediating more types of relations than ever before. The first challenge is to acknowledge this transformation. This may sound obvious, but it is important in identity politics for a group to acknowledge its relevant others, wherein the ‘we-group’ is dependent on this acknowledgement. The fact that diplomacy’s circle of relevant others is widening does not mean that diplomacy’s circle of recognition is expanding as well. Diplomats and diplomatic services continue to seek recognition primarily from other diplomats and other diplomatic services. When diplomats effectively come to understand that they are actually dependent on the recognition of other social entities, they will be forced to

review and improve upon their traditional methods. Here let me mention two: hierarchy and *modus operandi*.

Hierarchy is a cherished principle of diplomacy, and in many ways it is unavoidable. Clear communication of intent is a key diplomatic task which spells coordination, and coordination spells some kind of hierarchy. However, the stronger the hierarchy, the more cumbersome the chain of command, and the longer the reaction time. This means that globalisation, which compresses time, is a direct challenge to hierarchy. New technologies also favour hierarchy – e-mails may be used for commands, and electronic texts make it easier for the top of the hierarchy to trim information right up until its release. At the same time, these technologies have contributed to the density of flows that put the hierarchy under attack. We may look to the Danish diplomatic service for one type of response – to increase the number of interfaces between diplomats and their environment. During the 1990s, the Danish MFA simply decided that any diplomat should be empowered to answer a wide range of questions from outside and take various new initiatives on his or her own. This did not change the principle of hierarchy in any way – people who are out of line still get slapped down and the insubordinate are disciplined, just as they used to be – but the subject matter to which hierarchy is applied shrunk dramatically. If an organisation can speak with a thousand voices on many issues on which it used to be able to speak with only one, that spells increased action capacity. The network organisation is simply a far more efficient model for fulfilling the key diplomatic function of information collection and dissemination under the conditions created by globalisation than is the old megaphone model. It also gives the Danish MFA the upper hand over other diplomatic services that still do not trust their employees to speak on their behalf on quotidian business, and therefore deem it necessary to handle all kinds of queries from the very top.

A second consequence stemming from the range of polities is a proliferation of sources of information. The public struggle for defining reality intensifies, and diplomats have certain disadvantages in this respect. Since journalists specialise in speed while academics have focused on adding social and historical context, diplomats will tend to lose out to these relevant others, on both breaking news and on analysis. For decades now, diplomatic services have sought to compensate for this by co-opting journalists and academics. Diplomats have nonetheless maintained their *modus operandi* of reacting to others rather than initiating action themselves. The advent of globalisation has put this principle under increasing pressure, for with the mounting speed of information and density, the advantages of having the communicative initiative are forever growing. The Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) has experimented with changing the *modus operandi* from being reactive to being pro-active – or, as they put it, from being ‘backward leaning’ to being ‘forward leaning’. The increase in efficiency in carrying out the function of communication is obvious. Why have other services not followed suit? One possibility is habit, but a more probable reason concerns identity. Under the old rules, it is better to be sought after rather than to be the seeker; better to answer than to ask. Being pro-active means acknowledging to the competition that you are not indispensable. A prerequisite for pro-activeness is recognition of other social

groups as something more than passive takers. Here we have a transformation that is bound to come, but that is still hampered by a lingering diplomatic self-understanding and idea of its place in society that is definitely pre-globalisation.

If there is an overall logic to the shift in political rationality under conditions of globalisation, it has to do with a change from direct to indirect rule. More is left to individuals, and control is growing more indirect, with direct control increasingly reserved for after-the-fact situations when indirect control has proven too soft to secure the desired result. This logic is working its way into diplomacy as well. Consider a move like the Danish one, where the function of information is made into everybody's concern. This depends on indirect control being effective. By training its employees well in advance, the top of the organisation sees to it that the answers given when the top does not listen will be within acceptable parameters. Direct control kicks in when this indirect strategy does not work. Then consider pro-activeness. It is about orchestrating social situations in advance, in the hope that the outcome will be more favourable than it would otherwise have been. By employing indirect means, you can save the use of more direct means for a later point. It is all about governing from afar. But if you want to govern from afar, then you have to be far-sighted. A plan for the long haul is needed in order to consider different outcomes, to listen to second opinions and to have contingency plans. All this breaks with the established *modus operandi* of diplomacy. In sum, it is not on the level of subject matter or personnel, but rather on the level of organising principles that globalisation seems to be having the keenest impact on diplomatic practice.

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